William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 2

Article 12

2002

State v. Grossman: The Minnesota Supreme Court
Applies Apprendi to Minnesota's Patterned Sex
Offender Statute, but What Lies Ahead?
Eric C. Hallstrom

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Hallstrom, Eric C. (2002) "State v. Grossman: The Minnesota Supreme Court Applies Apprendi to Minnesota's Patterned Sex
Offender Statute, but What Lies Ahead?," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 29: Iss. 2, Article 12.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Hallstrom: State v. Grossman: The Minnesota Supreme Court Applies Apprendi t
FINAL HALLSTROM GROSSMAN. DOC

10/28/2002 10:50 PM

STATE V. GROSSMAN: THE MINNESOTA SUPREME
COURT APPLIES APPRENDI TO MINNESOTA’S
PATTERNED SEX OFFENDER STATUTE,
BUT WHAT LIES AHEAD?
Eric C. Hallstrom†
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................411
II. STATE V. GROSSMAN ..............................................................414
III. THE STATE OF THE LAW .......................................................419
A. The Federal Drug Laws and Mandatory Minimums..........419
B. Recidivism Statutes........................................................422
C. Retroactivity..................................................................424
D. The Death Penalty .........................................................427
IV. W HAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?...................................................429
V. CONCLUSION .......................................................................435
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi
1
v. New Jersey, commentators and courts have struggled with the
implications of the decision and its various, fractured opinions.
Criminal law practitioners, academics, and jurists, as well as
Supreme Court observers, have become familiar with the Court’s
oft-quoted conclusion that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
2
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” The rule announced in
Apprendi may seem straightforward, but the question of how far the

† Teaching Fellow, Federal Legislation Clinic, Georgetown University Law
Center. B.A. 1998, Augustana College (Sioux Falls); J.D. 2001, University of Iowa
College of Law. Law Clerk, Hon. Donald P. Lay, United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, 2001-2002. The author would like to especially thank Kevin
Gregorius for his helpful comments and suggestions.
1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. Id. at 490.
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principle underlying that rule should extend proves more elusive.
This is reflected, to some extent, in the difference of opinion that
exists as to whether the decision in Apprendi represented a
transformation in the law at all. While some suggest the Court’s
pronouncement constituted a sea change in its approach to
4
criminal law, others insist the Court was merely restating the law as
5
it had existed for some time. This term, the Minnesota Supreme
6
Court heard its first Apprendi-based challenge in State v. Grossman.
In Apprendi, the U.S. Supreme Court significantly restricted the
degree of freedom previously enjoyed by legislatures to decide
which facts constituted the essential elements of a crime and which
were merely sentencing enhancements to be considered by the
7
judge during the sentencing phase of a criminal trial. The case
arose from an incident in 1994 when Charles Apprendi was
arrested for firing several shots into the home of an African
American family who had recently moved into his neighborhood.
Apprendi received ten years in prison for possession of a firearm
for unlawful purposes, but was also given two additional years based
on the sentencing judge’s finding “that the crime was motivated by
8
racial bias.” Under the New Jersey scheme, the judge’s finding
9
needed only to be based on a preponderance of the evidence. In a
5-4 decision written by Justice Stevens, the court concluded that
“[i]t is ‘unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury
the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of
penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally
3. See Alan Michaels, Truth in Conviction: Understanding and Evaluating
Apprendi, 12 FED . SENTENCING REP. 320, 324 (2000) (arguing the court’s narrow
rule-based approach was preferable to enacting a grand (but likely unenforceable)
“standard” or doing nothing at all).
4. Justice O’Connor is probably the most notable member of this group,
referring to the decision as a “watershed change in constitutional law.” Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 524 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). For further discussion of the extent to
which Apprendi represents a change in constitutional criminal procedure, see infra
Part III.C.
5. See, e.g., Robert S. Lewis, Note, Preventing the Tail From Wagging the Dog:
Why Apprendi’s Bark is Worse Than Its Bite, 52 CASE W. RES . L. REV. 599, 625 (2001)
(concluding that Apprendi “did not actually state a new rule of constitutional law,”
but “merely synthesized existing case law into a clear, concise rule”).
6. 636 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 2001).
7. Stephanos Bibas, Back from the Brink, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 5, 2002, at 59.
8. State v. Apprendi, 698 A.2d 1265, 1267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997)
(quoting the sentencing judge).
9. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 472-73.
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clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a
10
reasonable doubt.’” “Simply put, the Court found it violates due
process as well as the Sixth Amendment to convict a person for one
11
crime but punish him or her for another.”
The decision in Apprendi dealt with “a core issue” in criminal
law—the constitutional limitations on legislatures’ power to define
12
the elements of a given crime. Thus, it is not surprising that the
decision raised a number of questions about our current approach
13
to sentencing and brought a great deal of judicial attention to an
area of law previously considered to be the near exclusive province
14
of the legislative branch. As the Court demonstrated this past
15
term, it has not yet finished fine-tuning this area of the law.
Nevertheless, the task of faithfully applying the Court’s decision in
the myriad contexts in which it arises inevitably falls to the state and
lower federal courts.
In December 2001, the Minnesota Supreme Court handed
16
down its decision in State v. Grossman, applying the Apprendi
decision for the first time. This case presented the court with a
relatively simple decision. The sentencing enhancement at issue
quite clearly violated Apprendi because it increased the maximum
10. Id. at 490 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999)
(opinion of Stevens, J.)).
11. Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court Review, TRIAL, Nov. 2000, at 102.
12. Michaels, supra note 3, at 320; see also Jeffrey Standen, The End of the Era of
Sentencing Guidelines: Apprendi v. New Jersey, 87 IOWA L. REV. 775, 776-77 (2002).
13. Justice Breyer’s dissent (and to some extent O’Connor’s) was concerned
with the practical impact of the decision on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and other guided discretion sentencing schemes. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 555-66
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
14. See Douglas A. Berman, Appraising and Appreciating Apprendi, 12 FED .
SENTENCING REP. 303, 303 (2000) (stating that “most . . . reforms to state and
federal sentencing systems have been legislative developments driven principally
by policy considerations rather than constitutional concerns”); see also Nancy J.
King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1468-69 (2001).
While some may approach this as an exercise in apportioning power between the
legislative and judicial branches, at least one commentator has suggested that it is
more appropriate to view the cases in this area as apportioning responsibilities
between the judge and jury. See Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90
GEO. L.J. 387, 392 (2002).
15. This past term, the Supreme Court heard three Apprendi-related appeals
despite the absence of a circuit split or clear inconsistencies in the application of
Apprendi by state courts of last resort. See infra Part III. As of the writing of this
article, there are no Apprendi-based claims on the Court’s 2002-03 docket, but it is
safe to assume at least one will make it there within the next few years.
16. 636 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 2001).
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available sentence based on findings made by the sentencing court
by a preponderance of the evidence. This article will look at the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Grossman with an eye
toward the issues that may yet arise as a result of Apprendi and
subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, potential legislative and
judicial responses, and specifically those developments unique to
Minnesota.
Part II describes in detail the decision in Grossman, focusing on
any discernable indications of how the Minnesota Supreme Court
views this developing area of the law. Part III looks briefly at some
of the other developments in the law post-Apprendi, including the
17
U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Harris v. United States, Ring v.
18
19
Arizona, and United States v. Cotton. Part IV then identifies some
potential issues and challenges that lie ahead for attorneys and the
courts. Finally, I conclude that, like many courts, the Minnesota
appellate courts will move cautiously when considering due process
and Sixth Amendment challenges to state sentencing statutes. It is
always possible that the Minnesota Supreme Court will be forced to
apply Apprendi and its progeny to unique and unexpected
circumstances. For the time being, however, the U.S. Supreme
Court has indicated its willingness to take a lead in this area, and
the Minnesota Supreme Court has resisted the urge to be
unnecessarily creative.
II. STATE V. GROSSMAN
In November 1998, Jay Grossman agreed to give R.C., a young
woman whom he had never met before, a ride home from Moose
Country, a restaurant in Lilydale, Minnesota. After dropping off a
member of his own party, Grossman stopped the car in the vicinity
of R.C.’s friend’s townhouse. R.C. identified a vehicle parked
outside as belonging to one of her friends. As they got out of the
car, however, Grossman struck R.C. in the face, knocking her
unconscious. When R.C. regained consciousness, she found herself
in a field with Grossman on top, raping her. When she tried to
scream, Grossman put his hands over her mouth, repeatedly
punched her, and began to choke her. He stopped only after R.C.
17.
18.
19.

122 S. Ct. 2406 (2002).
122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
122 S. Ct. 1781 (2002).
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pretended to be dead. After raping her again, Grossman then left
R.C. lying in the field where she waited approximately thirty
20
minutes before she dared move to get help. R.C. suffered, among
other things, a fractured rib, a torn lingular frenelum (the tissue
attaching the tongue to the bottom of the mouth), and numerous
21
scratches and abrasions. At trial, Grossman confessed to beating
R.C. and causing her injuries, but he denied raping her and
claimed that he never intended to kill her. Nonetheless, the jury
returned guilty verdicts on six counts: attempted second-degree
murder, first-degree assault, third-degree assault, and three counts
22
of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
At sentencing, the court acknowledged that Minnesota
Statutes section 609.342 (first-degree criminal sexual conduct)
prescribes a maximum of thirty years imprisonment, a $40,000 fine,
or both, but noted that under certain circumstances section
609.108 increases the maximum time of imprisonment for a
23
“patterned sex offender.” The sentencing court then found,
20. Grossman, 636 N.W.2d at 546-47.
21. Id. at 547.
22. Id.
23. Id. Section 609.108, subdivision 1(a) makes doubling the presumptive
sentence mandatory if:
(1) the court is imposing an executed sentence, based on a sentencing
guidelines presumptive imprisonment sentence or a dispositional
departure for aggravating circumstances or a mandatory minimum
sentence, on a person convicted of committing or attempting to
commit [first-, second-, third-, or fourth-degree criminal sexual
conduct], or on a person convicted of committing [a predatory crime]
if it reasonably appears to the court that the crime was motivated by the
offender’s sexual impulses or was part of a predatory pattern of
behavior that had criminal sexual conduct as its goal;
(2) the court finds that the offender is a danger to public safety; and
(3) the court finds that the offender needs long-term treatment or
supervision beyond the presumptive term of imprisonment and
supervised release. The finding must be based on a professional
assessment by an examiner experienced in evaluating sex offenders
that concludes that the offender is a patterned sex offender.
M INN. STAT. § 609.108, subd. 1(a) (2001). Pursuant to subdivision 2 of the statute,
the maximum may be increased:
If the fact-finder determines, at the time of the trial or the guilty plea,
that a predatory offense was motivated by, committed in the course of,
or committed in furtherance of sexual contact or penetration, as
defined in section 609.341, and the court is imposing a sentence under
subdivision 1, the statutory maximum imprisonment penalty for the
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pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 609.108, (1) that
Grossman’s actions were part of a pattern of behavior that had
criminal sexual conduct as its goal and were motivated by his sexual
impulses, (2) that he was a danger to public safety, and (3) that he
needs long-term treatment or supervision beyond the presumptive
24
term of imprisonment or supervised relief. In addition, the court
25
found that the record was “filled with aggravating circumstances.”
Thereafter, the court sentenced Grossman to the enhanced
maximum prison term under Minnesota Statutes section 609.108:
26
forty years.
Grossman appealed the forty-year sentence. He argued that
Minnesota Statutes section 609.108, as applied, violated the U.S.
Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Apprendi that any fact
increasing the maximum penalty for a crime must be proven to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Minnesota Court of Appeals
agreed and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to
27
impose a maximum sentence of thirty years imprisonment. The
appellate court reasoned that the enhancement rested on findings
that must be made by a jury based on proof beyond a reasonable
28
doubt. Because section 609.108 sanctioned the sentencing court’s
imposition of the enhanced sentence based on its own findings, the
29
court concluded that it ran afoul of Apprendi.
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court, the state took the
position that section 609.108, subdivision 1, did not actually
authorize the sentencing court to increase the maximum penalty.
Rather, the state argued it was the jury’s finding under subdivision
2—that the offense “was motivated by, committed in the course of,
or committed in furtherance of sexual contact or penetration,”—
30
that authorizes application of the sentencing enhancement. The
court recognized that subdivision 1 did not by its own terms

offense is 40 years, notwithstanding the statutory maximum
imprisonment penalty otherwise provided for the offense.
Id. at subd. (2).
24. Grossman, 636 N.W.2d at 547.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. State v. Grossman, 622 N.W.2d 394, 399 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
28. Id. at 398.
29. Id.
30. Grossman, 636 N.W.2d at 549-50 (quoting M INN. STAT. § 609.108, subd. 2
(2001)).
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authorize the enhanced penalty. Similarly, the court acknowledged
that sexual penetration is an element of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, and was therefore implicit in the jury’s guilty verdict. The
state’s call for the court to isolate the sexual penetration
31
requirement, however, was rejected.
The Grossman court, looking exclusively at subdivision 2,
explained that “the jury’s finding of sexual penetration did not, by
itself, expose Grossman to an increased sentence. Section 609.108,
subdivision 2, contains the additional mandate that ‘the court is
32
imposing a sentence under subdivision 1.’” Subdivision 1, in turn,
applies if the sentencing judge makes a series of findings by a
preponderance of the evidence. In order to apply the enhanced
sentence, then, the sentencing court must have satisfied “two
conditions precedent: (1) the jury had to find sexual contact or
penetration; and (2) the court had to make the findings required
by subdivision 1. Both the finding of the jury and those of the
33
court were necessary, but neither was sufficient.” The state’s
interpretation would separate the two conditions and ignore the
use of the conjunctive “and.” The Grossman court refused to
34
disregard the plain and unambiguous language of subdivision 2.
Moreover, like New Jersey in Apprendi, Minnesota argued that
the factors considered by the sentencing court were traditional
sentencing factors, as opposed to elements of the offense, because
35
they focused on the defendant rather than the offense. The
factors were, therefore, appropriately within the purview of the
sentencing court. The Minnesota Supreme Court quickly disposed
of this contention by referencing the U.S. Supreme Court’s
observation that such an argument is “nothing more than a
36
disagreement with the rule we apply today.”
The Minnesota court signaled its agreement with the U.S.
Supreme Court’s admonition that the distinction between
“elements” and “sentencing factors” was “constitutionally novel and

31. Id. at 550.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing Burkstrand v. Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Minn. 2001)
and Kersten v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 608 N.W.2d 869, 874-75 (Minn.
2000)).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 550-51 and n.2 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 492).
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37

elusive.”
The Minnesota court embraced the U.S. Supreme
Court’s focus on the practical effect of the required findings—
whether they would increase the maximum penalty—as opposed to
determining whether they were traditionally considered elements
38
or sentencing factors. The court concluded:
[T]he fact that the findings listed in Minnesota Statutes §
609.108, subd. 1, are of a kind traditionally left to the
sentencing court rather than the jury is simply not
relevant to the constitutional issue at hand. The effect of
the sentencing court’s findings, when coupled with the
jury’s finding of sexual penetration, was to increase by 10
years the prison sentence to which Grossman was exposed.
Due process requires that each of these findings be made
39
by a jury based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, like the court of appeals,
remanded the case to the trial court for imposition of the
maximum sentence of thirty years in prison pursuant to Minnesota
40
Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 2. The court thought it
“clear that Minnesota threatened [Grossman] with . . . additional
pains . . . if the conditions of Minn. Stat. § 609.108, subd. 2, were
41
satisfied.” Therefore, “‘the procedural safeguards designed to
protect [Grossman] from unwarranted pains should apply equally’
to all of the facts Minnesota has singled out for enhanced
42
punishment.”
Finally, although Grossman challenged the
patterned sex offender statute as applied in his particular case, the
Minnesota Supreme Court noted its “doubts as to whether there
37. Id. at 550 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494).
38. Id. at 550-51. The Minnesota court also embraced the Supreme Court’s
definition of the terms:
The term [“sentencing factor”] appropriately describes a circumstance,
which may be either aggravating or mitigating in character, that
supports a specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury’s
finding that the defendant is guilty of a particular offense. On the
other hand, when the term “sentence enhancement” is used to
describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory
sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater
offense than the one covered by the jury’s guilty verdict. Indeed, it fits
squarely within the usual definition of an “element” of the offense.
Id. at 550 n.2 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19).
39. Id. at 551.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476) (alteration in original).
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are any circumstances under which subdivision 2 could be
43
constitutionally applied.”
III. THE STATE OF THE LAW
In order to appreciate Grossman and, more generally, the
sentencing laws in Minnesota, it is necessary to be familiar with
some of the key recent decisions from both the state and federal
courts. A thorough exploration of the jurisprudence of criminal
sentencing may be found elsewhere. What follows is a brief
summation of the law in four major areas affected by the decision
in Apprendi, as it has developed since the decision: (1) the federal
drug laws and mandatory minimums; (2) recidivism statutes; (3)
retroactivity; and (4) the death penalty.
A. The Federal Drug Laws and Mandatory Minimums
The federal drug laws were some of the first to be scrutinized
after Apprendi was decided. 21 U.S.C. § 841 makes it illegal to
possess a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. §
841(b) then specifies the penalty range depending on the quantity
of the controlled substance involved. The penalty can reach a
maximum of life imprisonment under § 841(b)(1)(B). If a specific
quantity is not proven, § 841(b)(1)(C) allows for the imposition of
a penalty of up to twenty years in prison. Prior to the decision in
Apprendi, the United States Courts of Appeals had uniformly
concluded “the amount of controlled substance ‘involved’ was a
sentencing factor for the judge to decide, not an element of the
offense that had to be charged and found by a jury by proof beyond
44
a reasonable doubt.” After Apprendi was decided, this approach
45
necessarily changed. Currently, in order to sentence a defendant
under § 841(b)(1)(A) or (B), the quantity must be charged in the
46
indictment and proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
43. Id. at n.3.
44. Michaels, supra note 3, at 322.
45. See United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 933 (8th Cir. 2000); see
also United States v. Doe, 297 F.3d 76, 83 (2d Cir. 2002) (extending the reasoning
in § 841 cases to § 960, which prohibits the importation of controlled substances,
based on the parallel structure of the two provisions).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 156-58 (4th Cir. 2001)
(“Thus, if a specific threshold quantity of drugs is not found by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, a judicial finding of that fact increases the allowable penalty
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At least that was commentators’ initial inclination. Less than
a month after Apprendi was decided, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided United States v. Aguayo48
Delgado. Aguayo-Delgado was the first in a long line of cases from
the various courts of appeals to hold that it was not a violation of
Apprendi for the sentencing court to rely upon a finding of drug
quantity “not charged in the indictment or found by the jury to
49
have been beyond a reasonable doubt” as long as the court
sentenced the defendant to less than 20 years, which is the
maximum for a violation of the statute simpliciter pursuant to §
50
841(b)(1)(C).
The rationale for this outcome is found in
51
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, a case seemingly at odds with, but
52
ultimately approved of by, the Apprendi majority.
McMillan upheld a provision of Pennsylvania’s Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing Act imposing a minimum sentence of five
years for certain crimes “if the sentencing judge found, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant ‘visibly
53
possessed a firearm’ during the offense.” Although the Apprendi
Court explicitly indicated its approval of McMillan, Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky noted the tension between the two cases:
If Apprendi is read literally, it applies only when the
punishment is greater than the statutory maximum for the
offense. In other words, it has no application when the
sentence is within the range prescribed by law. Yet its
central rationale—that it is wrong to convict a person of
one crime and impose punishment for another—logically
applies to factors
used to enhance penalties within the
54
statutory range.
beyond that authorized by the facts found by the jury alone.”).
47. See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 3, at 322; Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein,
Aprés Apprendi, 12 FED . SENTENCING REP. 331 (2000).
48. 220 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2000).
49. Id. at 934.
50. E.g., United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250, 1269-70 (11th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Rodgers, 245 F.3d 961, 965-68 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Harris, 243 F.3d 806, 809 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Robinson, 241 F.3d 115,
122 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Garcia-Sanchez, 238 F.3d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir.
2001); United States v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 2000).
51. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
52. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 n.13.
53. Lewis, supra note 5, at 609 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81).
54. Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 104. “Whether one raises the floor or
raises the ceiling it is impossible to dispute that the defendant is exposed to
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Despite the inconsistency between the rationale in Apprendi and the
holding in McMillan, the general consensus is that unless and until
the U.S. Supreme Court indicates otherwise, a sentence that falls
within the range authorized by the statute charged in the
55
indictment will not violate Apprendi. This was the conclusion
56
arrived at by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in State v. McCoy,
which affirmed the trial court’s imposition of a prison term four
times longer than the presumptive sentence because it “did not
exceed the statutory maximum of 25 years for second-degree
57
criminal sexual assault.”
To make matters worse, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a case
58
decided this past term, failed to completely resolve the question of
mandatory minimum sentencing schemes after Apprendi. In Harris
v. United States, the Court presumably intended to provide a final
answer to the question of whether the rationale articulated in
Apprendi would extend to circumstances where a defendant was
sentenced based on facts not charged in the indictment or found
by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt but where the sentence did
greater punishment than is otherwise prescribed.” Harris v. United States, 122 S.
Ct. 2406, 2426 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
55. See, e.g., Harris, 122 S. Ct. at 2414 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); United States
v. Foster, 2002 WL 1808434 (6th Cir. Aug. 6, 2002).
The vast majority of appeals being brought under Apprendi have been
quickly dismissed because they don’t involve sentences that extend
beyond the statutory maximum. Samuel Buffone of the Washington,
D.C., office of Boston’s Ropes & Gray says the flood of failed appeals
reflects an expectation among defense lawyers that future Apprendirelated rulings from the U.S. Supreme Court will be coming. Certainly
those people who have raised the issues in pending appeals will be in a
much better position than those who don’t . . . .
David E. Rovella, A Looming ‘Apprendi’ Tsunami?, NAT’ L L. J., Jan. 8, 2001, at A1
(internal quotations omitted).
56. 631 N.W.2d 446 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
57. Id. at 451. See also King v. State, 649 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. 2002); Archer v.
State, No. C3-02-82, 2002 WL 1424555 (Minn. Ct. App. July 2, 2002); Ashby v.
State, No. C2-01-1679, 2002 WL 977444 (Minn. Ct. App. May 14, 2002); Ledden v.
State, No. C4-01-1196, 2002 WL 171899 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2002); State v.
Kurowski, No. C6-01-552, 2002 WL 109356 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2002); State v.
Branch, No. C8-01-374, 2001 WL 1646508 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2001); State v.
Wasson, No. C5-01-1014, 2001 WL 1530255 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec 4, 2001); State v.
Hood, No. C9-00-2088, 2001 WL 1083916 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2001); Jackson
v. State, No. CX-01-36, 2001 WL 800039 (Minn. Ct. App. July 17, 2001); Beck v.
State, No. C4-00-1740, 2001 WL 682738 (Minn. Ct. App. June 19, 2001); State v.
Wasson, No. C4-00-443, 2000 WL 1617777 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2000).
58. Harris v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 2406 (2002).
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not exceed the maximum penalty authorized by law. The resulting
4-1-4 decision, however, while maintaining the status quo, failed to
command a majority who saw a principled distinction between
59
Apprendi and McMillan.
60

B. Recidivism Statutes

Another exception to the general rule laid down in Apprendi
was made for recidivism statutes. Justice Stevens’s articulation of
the holding in Apprendi famously declares that “[o]ther than the fact
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
61
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Apprendi’s
protections are unnecessary in such a context “because another
jury had already had the opportunity to pass upon the defendant’s
62
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Nonetheless, Justice Stevens
59. In Harris, the Court upheld the imposition of a mandatory minimum
sentence imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (mandating graduated
minimum sentences based upon a sentencing court’s findings regarding firearm
use or possession during a drug trafficking offense). Id. at 2415. A majority of the
Court held that Congress made brandishing a gun an element of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(A) rather than a sentencing factor, and reaffirmed the validity of
McMillan. Id. at 2414-15. Justice Breyer, however, did not agree with the
reasoning of Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Scalia. While Justice
Kennedy’s leading opinion announced that “McMillan and Apprendi are
consistent,” Justice Breyer could not distinguish the cases “in terms of logic.” Id. at
2414, 2420 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). Rather, he
thought “extending Apprendi to mandatory minimums would have adverse
practical, as well as legal, consequences.” Id. at 2420-21. Thus, while five Justices
voted in favor of maintaining McMillan’s continued validity, it appears that five
also recognize the inherent conflict between the reasoning in Apprendi and
McMillan (and consequently in Harris as well).
60. Recidivism statutes take a defendant’s prior convictions into account,
usually as a sentencing factor, but conceivably as an element of the offense. See
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994).
61. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added).
62. Lewis, supra note 5, at 617. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reached the
same conclusion in State v. Hopkins, No. C4-01-923, 2002 WL 980867 (Minn. Ct.
App. May 14, 2002), and Folden v. State, No. Co-01-31, 2001 WL 800025 (Minn.
Ct. App. July 17, 2001). Relying on the explicit language in Apprendi, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals held judicial finding of “the fact of a prior
conviction . . . may serve to increase a criminal defendant’s sentence without
violating his or her due process rights.” Hopkins, 2002 WL 980867, at *5. It is
significant, though, that the “Minnesota Supreme Court has previously held that
prior convictions resulting in increased penalties must be set out in an indictment
and ultimately decided by the adjudicatory jury.” State v. Stewart, 486 N.W.2d 444,
446 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding the fact of a prior conviction of a “heinous
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suggested the possibility that United States v. Almendarez-Torres, the
case holding prior convictions were sentencing factors that did not
have to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, was
64
decided incorrectly.
In Almendarez-Torres, the Court rejected an invitation to “simply
adopt a rule that any significant increase in a statutory maximum
65
sentence would trigger a Constitutional ‘elements’ requirement.”
In so doing, the court relied heavily upon McMillan’s finding that
66
mandatory minimums were not constitutionally infirm.
Furthermore, the Court thought “such a rule would seem
anomalous in light of existing case law that permits a judge, rather
than a jury, to determine the existence of factors that can make a
defendant eligible for the death penalty, a punishment far more
67
severe than that faced by petitioner here.”
It is no longer
constitutionally permissible for a judge to make the crucial factual
68
findings subjecting a defendant to the death penalty. It is unclear
to what extent this change may affect the Court’s conclusion were it
to revisit the issue, especially since McMillan is (apparently) still

crime” as defined in Minnesota Statutes section 609.106 “must be presented to the
grand jury in order for it determine whether probable cause exists to indict a
defendant for first degree murder.”). Therefore, in Minnesota it may be necessary
to charge certain prior convictions in the indictment and prove them to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. For a more in-depth discussion of this issue, see infra
Part IV.
63. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
64. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489. Justice Thomas would go further, requiring
evidence of past crimes to be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, just like
any other fact that could result in an increased sentence. Id. at 501-02 (Thomas,
J., concurring) (“[A] ‘crime’ includes every fact that is by law a basis for imposing
or increasing punishment (in contrast with a fact that mitigates punishment).”).
Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Thomas, argued the
constitutional “‘right to . . . trial, by an impartial jury,’ has no intelligible content
unless it means that all the facts which must exist in order to subject the defendant
to a legally prescribed punishment must be found by the jury.” Id. at 499 (Scalia,
J., concurring). Justice Scalia seems to have retreated moderately from this view,
given his alignment with Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Harris. See 122 S. Ct. at 2419
(“Within the range authorized by the jury’s verdict, however, the political system
may channel judicial discretion—and rely upon judicial expertise—by requiring
defendants to serve minimum terms after judges make certain factual findings.”).
65. 523 U.S. at 247.
66. Id. at 246-47.
67. Id. at 247 (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647 (1990)). Walton has
since been overruled. See Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002); infra Part III.D.
68. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2443.
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69

good law. It is clear, however, that until the U.S. Supreme Court
decides to address the issue directly, Apprendi and Almendarez-Torres
will continue to govern the lower courts’ approach to recidivism
70
statutes. Thus, for the time being, federal law does not require a
defendant’s prior convictions to be charged in the indictment or
proven to a jury.
C. Retroactivity
When a defendant challenges his sentence under Apprendi or
its progeny on direct appeal, he must survive harmless error review
71
if the claim was properly reserved, and the more demanding plain
72
error review if the claim was not. These doctrines may prove
significant obstacles to relief, but at least the opportunity to present
an Apprendi-based challenge is available. The vast majority of those
who could potentially benefit from the Court’s decision, however,
have exhausted their direct appeals. Those individuals must
73
pursue relief through collateral review. In Teague v. Lane, the U.S.
Supreme Court held “new rules” of criminal procedure should not
be applied retroactively unless (1) they protect certain conduct
from punishment altogether; or (2) they are “watershed ruling[s]
69. See supra Part III.A.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 270 F.3d 702, 708 (8th Cir. 2001) (“It
is the law in this circuit, until the Supreme Court chooses to revisit the question of
recidivism statutes, that Apprendi does not require the ‘fact’ of prior convictions to
be pled and proved to a jury.”) (citing cases from other circuits holding the same);
State v. Hopkins, 2002 WL 980867 at *4-5 (Minn. Ct. App. May 14, 2002).
71. King & Klein, supra note 47, at 332.
72. Id. See United States v. Cotton, 122 S. Ct. 1781 (2002) (holding the
defendant could not survive plain error review because, due to the overwhelming
evidence against him, the increased maximum sentence did not seriously affect
the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings); United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 731 (1993) (describing the court of appeals’ “limited power to correct
errors that were forfeited because not timely raised in district court”). But see
United States v. Doe, 297 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding, in a case similar to
Cotton, that the plain error standard was met because there was no overwhelming
evidence against Doe, like there was against Cotton). Cotton, the first of the
Court’s three post-Apprendi cases to be decided this past term, was somewhat more
limited in scope than the others, yet it considered important procedural and
jurisdictional questions. In addition to addressing the standard of review when the
error is not raised at trial, it also held that a defective indictment under Apprendi
(i.e., an indictment failing to set out all the facts that may lead to an enhanced
sentence) will “not deprive a court of its power to adjudicate a case.” Cotton, 122 S.
Ct. at 1785.
73. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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central to an accurate determination of guilt that ‘alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the
74
fairness of the proceeding.’” It cannot be suggested that Apprendi
protects specific conduct from punishment, so if it is to be applied
retroactively, it must be a new rule falling into the second
exception.
In order to be considered a “new rule,” a decision must not be
“dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s
75
conviction became final.” This does not mean the Court must
overturn a previous case or set forth a rule never previously
contemplated. Rather, clarification of an existing, but confusing,
76
rule may qualify as a new rule under Teague. “That Apprendi is a
‘new’ rule under Teague, not ‘dictated’ by prior precedent, is amply
illustrated by the debate between the justices about its consistency
77
with prior decisions.”
The more difficult question is whether Apprendi rose to the
level of a “watershed” development in the law of criminal
procedure. When Apprendi was decided, many commentators saw
the decision as one of great importance that would fundamentally
78
change the face of criminal sentencing. Given Justice O’Connor’s
dissenting opinion explicitly referring to the decision as a
79
“watershed change,” it is no surprise that some commentators and
courts saw the decision as one warranting retroactive application

74. King & Klein, supra note 47, at 333 (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227
(1990)).
75. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
76. Lewis, supra note 5, at 614. “Teague serves to ensure that gradual
developments in the law over which reasonable jurists may disagree are not later
used to upset the finality of state convictions valid when entered.” Sawyer, 497 U.S.
at 234.
77. King & Klein, supra note 47, at 333.
78. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 104; J. Stephen Welch, Apprendi
v. New Jersey: Watershed Ruling for the New Millennium?, S.C. LAW., Apr. 2001, at 37;
cf. Standen, supra note 12, at 779-84 (concluding that although Apprendi would
have a limited direct effect on formal procedure, it would have a significant impact
on criminal justice more generally because it exacerbates a trend towards greater
prosecutorial discretion in sentencing); accord Susan N. Herman, Applying
Apprendi to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: You Say You Want a Revolution?, 87
IOWA L. REV. 615 (2002); Supreme Contradiction, WASH. POST, June 25, 2002, at A18
(referring to Apprendi as “articulat[ing] a sweeping principle”)[hereinafter Supreme
Contradiction].
79. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Today, in what will
surely be remembered as a watershed change in constitutional law . . . .”).
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on collateral review pursuant to Teague’s second exception. The
majority of courts, however, have come to the contrary conclusion.
The Eighth Circuit’s reasoning is representative:
To fall within the exception, the rule must impart a
fundamental procedural right that, like Gideon, is a
necessary component of a fair trial. “It is . . . not enough
under Teague to say that a new rule is aimed at improving
the accuracy of trial. More is required. A rule that
qualifies under this exception must not only improve
accuracy, but also alter our understanding of the bedrock
procedural elements essential to the fairness of a
proceeding.” One need only peruse the cases, and the
“new rules” therein, in which the Supreme Court has
rejected the watershed exception’s applicability to
appreciate how absolutely fundamental the right must be
to satisfy the exception. Apprendi appears no more
“important” to a fair trial than rules previously addressed
by the Court, including the rule announced in Batson v.
Kentucky, which the Court refused to apply retroactively in
Teague.
Permitting a judge-found fact to affect the sentence
imposed after a valid conviction, even if it is found under
a more lenient standard, cannot be said to have resulted
in a fundamentally unfair criminal proceeding. As the
Fifth Circuit has noted, “one can easily envision a system
of ‘ordered liberty’ in which certain elements of a crime
can or must be proved to a judge, not to the jury,” and it is
not as though defendants have been foreclosed prior to
Apprendi from challenging facts that were
previously
81
thought to be sentencing considerations.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 109 F. Supp.2d 1059, 1065 (D. Minn.
2001); People v. Rush, 757 N.E.2d 88, 100 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); Huigens, supra note
14, at 388; Erwin Chemerinsky, Law Enforcement and Criminal Law Decisions, 28
PEPP. L. REV. 517, 523 (2001); Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence
Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L. J. 1097, 1145-46 n.313 (2001);
Welch, supra note 78, at 37.
81. United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (8th Cir. 2001) (internal
quotations and citations omitted); accord San-Miguel v. Dove, 291 F.3d 257 (4th
Cir. 2002); Goode v. United States, 39 Fed. Appx. 152 (6th Cir. 2002)
(unpublished opinion); United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664 (9th Cir.
2002); McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2001). Many scholars
agree. Professors Nancy J. King and Susan R. Klein have argued that,
unlike depravations of counsel, [the rule of Apprendi] does not protect
the blameless from punishment, but instead protects the
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Moreover, a number of courts have held that only the U.S.
Supreme Court may declare a decision retroactive, at least with
82
respect to successive collateral attacks. Therefore, unless there is
a clear pronouncement by the Supreme Court of retroactivity for
the rule announced in Apprendi or some future permutation
83
thereof— potentially Ring v. Arizona —it seems highly unlikely any
court will sanction its application on primary or successive
collateral review.
D. The Death Penalty
84

Ring v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court’s most
reaching post-Apprendi decision, is of relatively little significance in
Minnesota because Minnesota is one of twelve states that do not
85
employ capital punishment. As noted in the previous sections,
however, the reasoning underlying Ring may have an impact in
other Apprendi-related cases. Therefore, it is important to
understand the Court’s holding in Ring, and what compelled the
extension of Apprendi to capital sentencing on the same day it was
86
held not to apply to mandatory minimums.
Ring is, of course, noteworthy outside of the narrow context of
the issues raised herein because it held Arizona’s capital
unquestionably blameworthy from unauthorized amounts of
punishment. The decision does no more to “alter our understanding
of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of the
proceeding” than other rules rejected under the exception, including
the ruling in Batson v. Kentucky. Indeed, the Court has yet to find any
ruling that qualifies for this exception, and it seems unlikely to us that
the Apprendi rule will be the first.
King & Kline, supra note 47, at 333; accord Lewis, supra note 5, at 613-16.
82. Talbott v. State, 226 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2000) (“If the Supreme Court
ultimately declares that Apprendi applies retroactively on collateral attack, we will
authorize successive collateral review of cases to which Apprendi applies. Until
then prisoners should hold their horses and stop wasting everyone’s time with
futile applications.”).
83. See infra Part III.D.
84. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
85. See
Death
Penalty
Information
Center,
at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/firstpage.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2002).
86. Some have argued that Harris and Ring are inconsistent. See, e.g., Supreme
Contradiction, supra note 78. Such an inquiry is beyond the scope of this article. It
should be noted that in his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia articulates a
defensible position for his decision to join the majority in Ring, while refusing to
extend Apprendi to mandatory minimums in Harris. See Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2443-45
(Scalia, J., concurring).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002

17

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 12
FINAL HALLSTROM GROSSMAN. DOC

428

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

10/28/2002 10:50 PM

[Vol. 29:2

punishment system unconstitutional, invalidating the death
87
sentences of over 150 convicted killers. In a nutshell, Ring held
that a trial judge, sitting alone, could not constitutionally impose
the death penalty based on his or her own findings of aggravating
88
factors. Because Arizona’s first-degree murder statute authorized
a maximum penalty of death only after the finding of an
89
aggravating circumstance, Apprendi forbids that finding from
being made by a judge. Instead, the presence or absence of any
90
aggravating factors must be determined by a jury. Otherwise,
“Apprendi would be reduced to a meaningless and formalistic rule
91
of statutory drafting.” Ring is particularly significant because the
92
case that it overruled, Walton v. Arizona, was not only a relatively
recent decision (it was only twelve years old), but it held the exact
same capital sentencing statute to be “compatible with the Sixth
93
Amendment.”
Walton held “the Sixth Amendment does not require that the
specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of
94
death be made by the jury.” The Walton decision came on the
95
heals of Hildwin v. Florida, a case upholding Florida’s capital
sentencing scheme in which the jury recommends a sentence of
either life imprisonment or execution, but does not make any
96
findings respecting aggravating circumstances. In Jones v. United
87. While the decision addressed only Arizona’s capital punishment system, it
will directly affect at least four other states’ death penalty sentencing schemes:
Idaho, Montana, Colorado, and Nebraska. See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Sentencing
Laws Rejected; Top Court Declares Right to have Jury Decide Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB.,
June. 25, 2002, at 1; Associated Press, Court Overturns More Than 150 Judge-Imposed
Death Sentences (June 24, 2002), http://www.truthinjustice.org/ring.htm; David
Lindorff,
Another
Strike
Against
the
Death
Penalty,
at
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2002/06/25/ deathrow/index_np.html
(June 25, 2002). The decision could conceivably spill over into four other states:
Florida, Alabama, Indiana, and Delaware. Associated Press, supra. In these states,
juries only recommend whether the sentencing judge should impose a life
sentence or death. Id. In all, the decision could invalidate nearly eight hundred
death sentences. Id.
88. 122 S. Ct. at 2443.
89. Id. at 2437, 2443.
90. Id. at 2443.
91. Id. at 2431 (internal quotations omitted).
92. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
93. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2432.
94. 497 U.S. at 648 (internal quotations omitted).
95. 490 U.S. 638 (1989).
96. Id. at 640-41.
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97

States, the Court described the decision in Walton as one that
“characterized the finding of aggravating facts falling within the
traditional scope of capital sentencing as a choice between a
greater and a lesser penalty, not as a process of raising the ceiling
98
of the sentencing range available.” Even though the Apprendi
99
court thought its decision could be squared with Walton, by the
time Ring was decided, it was clear that the decisions could not be
100
reconciled.
IV. W HAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?
Since the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Grossman
was, more or less, a straightforward application of Apprendi, I have
attempted to place the decisions in a broader context. Keep in
mind that from the time Apprendi was decided in 2000, thousands
of cases citing that opinion have issued from state and federal
101
courts.
Those cases, however, can be grouped into a few basic
categories. Of the categories set out in Part III, some will be of
greater importance to those concerned with the development of
Minnesota’s criminal law and procedure. For instance, it appears
the question of Apprendi’s retroactive applicability on collateral
102
review has been all but settled. If any post-Apprendi decision has
the potential to upset the status quo in that regard, it is Ring v.
Arizona. And, as mentioned before, Ring is of extremely limited
103
relevance in capital punishment-free states such as Minnesota.
One area that may not yet be resolved is that of mandatory
minimums. As previously noted, Harris upheld McMillan but did so
104
without a majority consensus as to the reasoning. Consequently,
it seems likely that the U.S. Supreme Court will revisit the issue
97. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
98. Id. at 251.
99. “[O]nce a jury has found the defendant guilty of all the elements of an
offense which carries as its maximum penalty the sentence of death, it may be left
to the judge to decide whether that maximum penalty, rather than a lesser one,
ought to be imposed.” Appredi, 530 U.S. at 497.
100. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2432.
101. As of the publication of this article, a search for “Apprendi” in Westlaw’s
“allcases” database yielded over 4,000 cases, both published and unpublished.
Limiting that search to Minnesota state cases and federal cases having a direct
bearing on Minnesota courts (Westlaw’s “mn-cs-all” database) yielded 255 results.
102. See Moss, 252 F.3d at 999; see generally supra Part III.C.
103. See supra Part III.D.
104. See supra Part III.A.
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before long. In Harris, Justice Breyer walked a fine line between
the majority’s conclusion and the dissent’s reasoning. Although he
felt the key distinction supporting Justice Kennedy’s opinion was
logically infirm, he expressed great trepidation over the practical
impact of extending Apprendi’s rationale to mandatory
105
minimums.
Justice Breyer expressed both his disapproval for
mandatory minimums as a matter of policy as well as his concern
that extending Apprendi would not have the effect of ending their
106
use, but instead further disadvantage defendants. Legally, Justice
Breyer is afraid that extending Apprendi to mandatory minimums
would jeopardize the current system of guided sentencing
107
discretion.
It seems quite possible that Justice Breyer’s position in Harris is
not intractable. It is not impossible for Apprendi to be applied in a
manner consistent with guided sentencing schemes such as the
108
United States Sentencing Guidelines. Justice Breyer has himself
hinted at the potential for movement in his view in Harris by stating
that he could not “yet” extend Apprendi to mandatory minimum
109
sentences.
The point is this: Given Justice Breyer’s seemingly
tentative stance, as well as the ever present possibility of a change in
110
Court personnel, Harris is most likely not the Court’s last word on
105. 122 S. Ct. at 2420-21 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and in the judgment)
(“And because I believe that extending Apprendi to mandatory minimums would
have adverse practical, as well as legal consequences, I cannot yet accept its rule.”).
106. Id. at 2420-22. Indeed, Justice Breyer argues that by taking away from the
judge the power to make certain factual determinations, defendants will be forced
to argue flagrantly inconsistent positions to a jury or stipulate to the triggering
facts, which only serves to aggrandize the prosecutor’s power. Id. at 2421-22. For a
detailed discussion of this particular theory, see generally Bibas, supra note 80. For
an excellent rejoinder, see generally Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Apprendi
and Plea Bargaining, 54 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2001).
107. Harris, 122 S. Ct. at 2421-22; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 555-66.
108. See, e.g., Andrew J. Fuchs, Note, The Effect of Apprendi v. New Jersey on the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Blurring the Distinction Between Sentencing Factors and
Elements of a Crime, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1427-38 (2001).
109. 122 S. Ct. at 2421 (emphasis added). In Apprendi, Justice Breyer
suggested that, given the Court’s decision, mandatory minimum sentencing
“simply encourages any legislature interested in asserting control over the
sentencing process to do so by creating those minimums.” 530 U.S. at 564. This
further supports the possibility that he may be willing to reevaluate his position in
Harris.
110. See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Speculation Builds Over Chief Justice Successor,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 2002, at 1; George Watson, The Vacancy, at
http://partners.is.asu.edu/~george/vacancy/vacancy.html (last modified March
14, 2000).
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the subject of mandatory minimums and Apprendi. Therefore, it is
as imperative now as it was immediately following Apprendi for
defense counsel to be “constantly alert and raise every issue that the
111
Supreme Court has not definitively decided.” Failure to do so
will risk the application of a more stringent—and potentially fatal—
112
standard of review.
In addition, there are a few specific applications of Apprendi
that are of particular importance. First, there is the question of
conditional release under Minnesota Statutes section 609.108,
subdivision 6:
At the time of sentencing under subdivision 1, the court
shall provide that after the offender has completed the
sentence imposed . . . the commissioner of corrections
shall place the offender on conditional release for the
remainder of the statutory113maximum period, or for ten
years, whichever is longer.
As recently held by the Minnesota Court of Appeals, this provision
has the potential to “allow for both the maximum sentence and a
114
conditional release period beyond the maximum.”
In State v.
Jones, the defendant was given, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes
section 609.108, the maximum sentence for third-degree criminal
sexual conduct: fifteen years imprisonment. Nonetheless, the
sentencing court added ten years of conditional release under
115
subdivision 6.
Jones appealed his sentence, arguing that the
addition of the conditional release exposed him to a greater
sentence than that authorized by law for third-degree criminal
116
sexual conduct. The appellate court agreed and remanded the
case for resentencing.
The appellate court rightly concluded that conditional release
was “an obvious penalty that would allow appellant to invoke
117
Apprendi.”
The court went on to note that while conditional
release is mandatory, the duration of the conditional release is
111. John Kenneth Zwerling, Comprendez Apprendi?, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 309,
320 (2001) (referring to one of the lessons of the recently decided Apprendi case).
112. Id.; see supra notes 71 and 72 and accompanying text.
113. M INN. STAT. § 609.108, subd. 6 (2001).
114. State v. Jones, 647 N.W.2d 540, 547 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
115. Id.
116. Id.; see M INN. STAT. § 609.344, subd. 2.
117. Jones, 647 N.W.2d at 547; see also State v. Calmes, 632 N.W.2d 641, 649
(Minn. 2001) (recognizing conditional release is an aspect of punishment);
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 551 (holding applies to any increase in defendant’s penalty).
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not.
The court resolved the potential constitutional defects
raised by concluding that:
[W]here application of the conditional release term and
the rule forbidding imposition of prison time beyond the
statutory maximum are in unresolvable conflict, to avoid
unconstitutional application of law, the district court may
reduce appellant’s conditional release time to less than
ten years so that the conditional release time plus the
incarceration
time do not exceed the statutory maximum
119
of 15 years.
While this approach is appealing, it conflicts with the clear
language of section 609.108, subdivision 6. As such, the ultimate
resolution of this conflict may well require the authoritative
imprimatur of the state’s high court. Prosecutors and defense
counsel alike would be wise to keep this in mind as they craft their
arguments addressing conditional release statutes such as the one
at issue in Jones.
Furthermore, as noted above, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has previously held that “prior convictions resulting in increased
penalties must be set out in an indictment and ultimately decided
120
by the adjudicatory jury.” In State v. Stewart, the Minnesota Court
121
of Appeals relied upon State v. Findling
in holding that
“[e]vidence of a prior conviction of a heinous crime must be
presented to the grand jury in order for it to determine whether
probable cause exists to indict a defendant for first degree murder
punishable by life imprisonment without possibility of release as
122
defined by Minnesota Statutes § [609.106].” More recently, the
Minnesota Supreme Court explained that Findling is limited to
instances where there is “no statutory method to determine the
123
While Findling and Stewart were not
enhancement factors.”
applicable to the defendant’s argument in State v. Ronquist, it
appears they still apply to sentencing enhancement provisions like
those found in Minnesota Statutes section 609.106. To the extent
that determination of a “heinous crime” is potentially subject to
fact determinations, and where there exists no statutorily
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Jones, 647 N.W.2d at 547-48.
Id. at 548.
State v. Stewart, 486 N.W.2d 444, 446 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
12 Minn. 413, 144 N.W. 142 (1913).
Stewart, 486 N.W.2d at 448.
State v. Ronquist, 600 N.W.2d 444, 449 n.26 (Minn. 1999).
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articulated method by which to determine the enhancement
factors, Stewart should still apply. So, despite the fact that Apprendi
explicitly carves out an exception for recidivism statutes, under
Minnesota law there will be occasions where Apprendi must be
extended to the fact of a prior conviction.
Finally, it will be important to watch the legislative response to
Apprendi and its progeny. Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg has
124
suggested that Apprendi “will serve as a legislative drafting guide.”
The problem, as identified by numerous commentators, is that “the
procedural due process limitations on sentencing that are apparent
125
in Apprendi can be avoided fairly easily by a legislature.” In fact, it
has been predicted that Apprendi will eventually “bring about the
end of sentencing guidelines systems because ‘tough-on-crime’
legislators will favor the post-Apprendi world and enact legislation to
126
take advantage of it.”
This is compounded by the Court’s
decision in Harris:
[B]y shifting statutory maximums and minimums around,
Congress will be able to artfully modify the instances in
which defendants do and do not get a jury—and thus to
control when the Sixth Amendment applies. But, of
course, the fair trial/jury trial right is supposed to be a
check on Congress, not something it can easily
circumvent
127
by redrafting legislation a different way . . . .
This possibility did not slip by the members of the Apprendi
majority undetected. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
addressed the argument as articulated by Justice O’Connor in her
124. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Due Process, History, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 249 (2001).
125. Id. at 250. As explained by Professor Alan Michaels, using the statute in
Apprendi as an example,
New Jersey could also try to respond by revising the statutory penalty
for second-degree offenses from five to twenty years, while enacting a
separate provision that forbids the judge from imposing a sentence of
more than ten years unless the judge finds that the defendant
committed the offense with a biased purpose.
Michaels, supra note 3, at 320. This “Revised Penalty Statute” makes only a slight
semantic change, yet achieves precisely the same result rejected in Apprendi
without offending Apprendi’s rule as set out in that case. Id. at 321.
126. Standen, supra note 12, at 784.
127. Mark H. Allenbaugh, Why a Recent Supreme Court Decision Inexplicably will
Continue to Allow Mandatory Minimum Sentences to be Based on Hearsay Evidence Never
Presented to a Jury or Proven Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, FINDLAW’ S WRIT, ¶19 (June 27,
2002), at http://writ.findlaw.com/commentary/20020627_allenbaugh.html.
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dissent:
The principal dissent would reject the Court’s rule as a
“meaningless formalism,” because it can conceive of
hypothetical statutes that would comply with the rule and
achieve the same result as the New Jersey statue. While a
State could, hypothetically, undertake to revise its entire
criminal code in the manner the dissent suggests—
extending all statutory maximum sentences to, for
example, 50 years and giving judges guided discretion as
to a few specially selected factors within that range—this
possibility seems remote. Among other reasons, structural
democratic constraints exist to discourage legislatures
from enacting penal statutes that expose every defendant
convicted of, for example, weapons possession, to a
maximum sentence exceeding that which is, in the
legislature’s judgment, generally proportional to the
crime. This is as it should be. Our rule ensures that a
State is obliged “to make its choices concerning the
substantive content of its criminal laws with full awareness
of the consequences, unable to mask substantive policy
choices” of exposing all who are convicted to the
maximum sentence it provides. So exposed, “[t]he
political check on potentially
harsh legislative action is
128
more likely to operate.”
Although there is some empirical evidence that Justice Stevens is
correct--that the worst case scenarios predicted will not come
129
about --Professor Joseph L. Hoffman has identified a key
difference: the class of persons affected by Apprendi and its progeny
lack the type of political power required to turn the political
130
process into an effective “structural democratic constraint.” In
the event that such constraints fail, Justice Stevens has indicated the
Court “would be required to question whether the revision was

128. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n.16 (internal citations omitted).
129. Joseph L. Hoffmann, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back to the Future?, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 255, 272-75 (2001) (considering the implications of Apprendi
through the lens of a line of Supreme Court decisions addressing similar
principles in the context of affirmative defenses).
130. “Under Apprendi, the class of persons affected by the creation of
‘sentencing factors’ typically does not include legislators or their families or
friends. This is because most such ‘sentencing factors’ are enhancements—meaning
that they merely enhance the sentence for someone who already has been convicted
of a crime.” Id. at 274-75.
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constitutional under this Court’s prior decisions.”
And this
second, legal check on the legislative branch’s ability to take
“particularly draconian efforts to impose punishment” means the
criminal bar will yet have a significant roll to play in the continuing
effort to identify the limits on legislative hegemony over substantive
132
criminal law.
V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Grossman
this term was anything but an earth-shattering decision. It affirmed
a well-reasoned opinion by the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which
in turn held a portion of the Minnesota patterned and predatory
sex offender statute unconstitutional. While a majority of the cases
to be brought in state and federal courts after Apprendi have not
alleged clear, or even arguable, constitutional violations, the
provision at issue in Grossman is clearly inconsistent with the rule
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New
Jersey. Although the decision may not have been exciting, or even
challenging, it was important. The Minnesota Supreme Court has
indicated its willingness to enter a complicated and vital debate
about the limits on the legislative branch’s control over the
substance of the criminal law. This is significant because it will
require the court, from time to time, to invalidate democratically
enacted and politically popular laws. And because of the political
powerlessness of many of those who will feel the brunt of those
sanctions, the court’s role is all the more important.
Apprendi-based challenges lie hidden in the criminal statutes.
In this article I have identified just a few of the ways the complex
amalgamation of laws we call the criminal code may present
situations where they cannot be applied consistently with the
Supreme Court’s pronouncements in Apprendi and its progeny.
But as always, it is the practicing attorney who can and must be the
131. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n.16.
132. As stated by Professors Nancy J. King and Susan R. Klein, “We believe this
second admonishment is a viable threat, and will soon become the focus of intense
litigation.” King & Klein, supra note 14, at 1487. It is imperative for anyone
practicing criminal law to familiarize themselves with the impressively welldeveloped due process analysis set out by Professors King and Klein. The
Supreme Court, it would seem, already has. See Harris v. United States, 122 S. Ct.
2406, 2416 (2002) (citing Professors King and Klein’s Essential Elements for its
historical analysis).
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driving force behind the efforts to bring our criminal laws into
compliance with the demands of the Constitution.
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